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Game-theoretical control with continuous action sets
Steven Perkins, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, and David S. Leslie
Abstract
Motivated by the recent applications of game-theoretical learning techniques to the design of distributed control
systems, we study a class of control problems that can be formulated as potential games with continuous action sets,
and we propose an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm that provably converges to equilibrium in this class of
problems. The method employed is to analyse the learning process under study through a mean-field dynamical system
that evolves in an infinite-dimensional function space (the space of probability distributions over the players’ continuous
controls). To do so, we extend the theory of finite-dimensional two-timescale stochastic approximation to an infinite-
dimensional, Banach space setting, and we prove that the continuous dynamics of the process converge to equilibrium
in the case of potential games. These results combine to give a provably-convergent learning algorithm in which players
do not need to keep track of the controls selected by the other agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much recent activity in using techniques of learning in games to design distributed control systems.
This research traverses from utility function design [1–3], through analysis of potential suboptimalities due to the use
of distributed selfish controllers [4] to the design and analysis of game-theoretical learning algorithms with specific
control-inspired objectives (reaching a global optimum, fast convergence, etc.) [5, 6].
In this context, considerable interest has arisen from the approach of [1, 2] in which the independent controls
available to a system are distributed among a set of agents, henceforth called “players”. To complete the game-
theoretical analogy, the controls available to a player are called “actions”, and each player is assigned a utility function
which depends on the actions of all players (as does the global system-level utility). As such, a player’s utility in a
particular play of the game could be set to be the global utility of the joint action selected by all players. However, a
more learnable choice is the so-called Wonderful Life Utility (WLU) [1, 2], in which the utility of any particular player
is given by how much better the system is doing as a result of that player’s action (compared to the situation where
no other player changes their action but the focal player uses a baseline action instead). A fundamental result in this
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2domain is that setting the players’ utilities using WLUs results in a potential game [7] (see Section II below). There
are alternative methods for converting a system-level utility function into individual utilities, such as Shapley value
utility [8]; however, most of these also boil down to a potential game (possibly in the extended sense of [3]) where
the optimal system control is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus, by representing a control problem as a potential
game, the controllers’ main objective amounts to reaching a Nash equilibrium of the resulting game.
On the other hand, like much of the economic literature on learning in games [9, 10], the vast majority of this corpus
of research has focused almost exclusively on situations where each player’s controls comprise a finite set. This allows
results from the theory of learning in games to be applied directly, resulting in learning algorithms that converge
to the set of equilibria – and hence system optima. However, the assumption of discrete action sets is frequently
anomalous in control, engineering and economics: after all, prices are not discrete, and neither are the controls in
a large number of engineering systems. For instance, in massively parallel grid computing networks (such as the
Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing – BOINC) [11], the decision granularity of “bag-of-tasks”
application scheduling gives rise to a potential game with continuous action sets [7]. A similar situation is encountered
in the case of energy-efficient power control and power allocation in large wireless networks [12, 13]: mobile wireless
users can transmit at different power levels (or split their power across different subcarriers [14]), and their throughput
is a continuous function of their chosen transmit power profiles (which have to be optimized unilaterally and without
recourse to user coordination or cooperation). Finally, decision-making in the emerging “smart grid” paradigm for
power generation and management in electricity grids also revolves around continuous variables (such as the amount
of power to generate, or when to power down during the day), leading again to game-theoretical model formulations
with continuous action sets [15].
In this paper, we focus squarely on control problems (presented as potential games) with continuous action sets
and we propose an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm that provably converges to equilibrium. To address
this problem in an economic setting, very recent work by Perkins and Leslie [16] extended the theory of learning in
games to zero-sum games with continuous action sets (see also [17, 18]); however, from a control-theoretical point
of view, zero-sum games are of limited practical relevance because they only capture adversarial interactions between
two players. Owing to this fundamental difference between zero-sum and potential games, the two-player analysis of
[16] no longer applies to our case, so a completely different approach is required to obtain convergence in the context
of many-player potential games.
To accomplish this, our analysis relies on two theoretical contributions of independent interest. The first is the
extension of stochastic approximation techniques for Banach spaces (otherwise known as “abstract stochastic approx-
imation” [19–24]) to the so-called “two-timescales” framework originally introduced in standard (finite-dimensional
space) stochastic approximation by [25]. This allows us to consider interdependent strategies and value functions
evolving as a stochastic process in a Banach space (the space of signed measures over the players’ continuous
action sets and the space of continuous functions from action space to R respectively, both endowed with appropriate
norms). Our second contribution is the asymptotic analysis of the mean field dynamics of this process on the space
of probability measures on the action space; our analysis reveals that the dynamics’ rest points in potential games
3are globally attracting, so, combined with our stochastic approximation results, we obtain the convergence of our
actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm to equilibrium.
In Section II we introduce the framework and notation, and introduce our actor–critic learning algorithm. Following
that, in Section III we introduce two-timescales stochastic approximation in Banach spaces, and prove our general
result. Section IV applies the stochastic approximation theory to the actor–critic algorithm to show that it can be
studied via a mean field dynamical system. Section V then analyses the convergence of the mean field dynamical
system in potential games, a result which allows us to prove the convergence of the actor–critic process in this context.
II. ACTOR–CRITIC LEARNING WITH CONTINUOUS ACTION SPACES
Throughout this paper, we will focus on control problems presented as potential games with finitely many players
and continuous action spaces. Such a game comprises a finite set of players labelled i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For each i there
exists an action set Ai ⊂ R which is a compact interval;1 when each player selects an action ai ∈ Ai, this results in
a joint action a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ A = ∏Ni=1Ai. We will frequently use the notation (ai, a−i) to refer to the joint
action a in which Player i uses action ai and all other players use the joint action a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ).
Each player i is also associated with a bounded and continuous utility function ui : A → R. For the game to be a
potential game, there must exist a potential function φ : A→ R such that
ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a˜i, a−i) = φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a˜i, a−i)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for all a−i and for all ai, a˜i. Thus if any player changes their action while the others do not, the
change in utility for the player that changes their action is equal to the change in value of the potential function of the
game. Methods for constructing potential games from system utility functions [1–3] usually ensure that the potential
corresponds to the system utility, so maximising the potential function corresponds to maximising the system utility.
Game-theoretical analyses usually focus on mixed strategies where a player selects an action to play randomly. A
mixed strategy for Player i is defined to be a probability distribution over the action space Ai. This is a simple concept
when Ai is finite, but for the continuous action spaces Ai considered in this paper more care is required. Specifically,
let Bi be the Borel sigma-algebra on Ai and let P(Ai,Bi) denote the set of all probability measures on Ai. Throughout
this article we endow P(Ai,Bi) with the weak topology, metrized by the bounded Lipschitz norm (see Section IV;
also [16, 26, 27]). A mixed strategy is then an element πi ∈ P(Ai,Bi); for Bi ∈ Bi we have that πi(Bi) is the
probability that Player i selects an action in the Borel set Bi. Note that a mixed strategy under this definition need not
admit a density with respect to Lebesgue measure, and in particular may contain an atom at a particular action ai.
Returning to our game-theoretical considerations, we extend the definition of utilities to the space∆ =
∏N
i=1 P(A
i,Bi)
of mixed strategy profiles. In particular, let π ∈ ∆ be a mixed strategy profile, and define
ui(π) =
∫
A1
· · ·
∫
AN
ui(a)π1(da1) · · ·πN (daN ).
1We are only making this assumption for convenience; our analysis carries through to higher-dimensional convex bodies with minimal hassle.
4As before we use the notation (πi, π−i) to refer to the mixed strategy profile π in which Player i uses πi and all
other players use π−i = (π1, . . . , πi−1, πi+1, . . . , πN ). In further abuse of notation, we write (ai, π−i) for the mixed
strategy profile (δai , π−i), where δai is the Dirac measure at ai (meaning that Player i selects action ai with probability
1). Hence ui(ai, π−i) is the utility to Player i for selecting ai when all other players use strategy π−i.
A central concept in game theory is the best response correspondence of Player i, i.e. the set of mixed strategies that
maximise Player i’s utility given any particular opponent mixed strategy π−i. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of
this correspondence, in which all players are playing a best response to all other players. In a learning context however,
the discontinuities that appear in best response correspondences can cause great difficulties [28]. We focus instead on
a smoothing of the best response. For a fixed η > 0, the logit best response with noise level η of Player i to strategy
π−i is defined to be the mixed strategy Liη(π−i) ∈ P(Ai,Bi) such that
Liη(π
−i)(Bi) =
∫
Bi exp
{
η−1ui(ai, π−i)
}
dai∫
Ai exp {η
−1ui(bi, π−i)} dbi
(1)
for each Bi ∈ Bi. In [18] it is shown that Liη(π−i) ∈ P(Ai,Bi) is absolutely continuous (with respect to Lebesgue
measure), with density given by
liη(π
−i)(ai) =
exp
{
η−1ui(ai, π−i)
}∫
Ai exp {η
−1ui(bi, π−i)} dbi
. (2)
To ease notation in what follows, we let Lη(π) =
(
L1η(π
−1), . . . , LNη (π
−N )
)
.
The existence of fixed points of Lη is shown in [18] and [16]; such a fixed point is a joint strategy π such that
πi = Liη(π
−i) for each i, and so is a mixed strategy profile such that every player is playing a smooth best response
to the strategies of the other players. Such profiles π are called logit equilibria and the set of all such fixed points will
be denoted by LEη. A logit equilibrium is thus an approximation of a local maximizer of the potential function of
the game in the sense that for small η a logit equilibrium places most of the probability mass in areas where the joint
action results in a high potential function value; in particular, logit equilibria approximate Nash equilibria when the
noise level is sufficiently small.2
Smooth best responses also play an important part in discrete action games, particularly when learning is considered.
In this domain they were introduced in stochastic fictitious play by [30], and later studied by, among others, [31–33]
to ensure the played mixed strategies in a fictitious play process converge to logit equilibrium. This is in contrast to
classical fictitious play in which the beliefs of players converge, but the played strategies are (almost) always pure.
The technique was also required by [34–36] to allow simple reinforcement learners to converge to logit equilibria: as
discussed in [34], players whose strategies are a function of the expected value of their actions cannot converge to a
Nash equilibrium because, at equilibrium, all actions in the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies will receive
the same expected reward.
Recently [18] developed the dynamical systems tools necessary to consider whether the smooth best response
dynamics converge to logit equilibria in the infinite-dimensional setting. This was extended to learning systems in
2We note here that the notion of a logit equilibrium is a special case of the more general concept of quantal response equilibrium introduced in
[29].
5Algorithm 1 Actor-critic Reinforcement Learning Based on Logit Best Responses
Parameters: step-size sequences αn, γn.
Initialize critics Qi, actors pii; n← 0.
Repeat
n← n+ 1;
foreach player i = 1, . . . , N do
select action ai based on actor pii; #play the game
update critic: Qi ← Qi + γn(ui(a1, . . . , aN )−Qi); #update payoff estimates
draw sample bi ∼ Liη(Qi); #sample logit best response
update actor: pii ← pii + αn(δbi − pii); #update mixed strategies
until termination criterion is reached.
[16], where it was shown that stochastic fictitious play converges to logit equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games
with compact continuous action sets.
One of the main requirements for efficient learning in a control setting is that the full utility functions of the game
need not be known in advance, and players may not be able to observe the actions of all other players. Using fictitious
play (or, indeed, many of the other standard game-theoretical tools) does not satisfy this requirement because they
assume full knowledge and observability of payoff functions and opponent actions. This is what motivates the simple
reinforcement learning approaches discussed previously [34–36], and also the actor-critic reinforcement learning
approach of [37], which we extend in this article to the continuous action space setting. The idea is to learn both a value
function Qi : Ai → R that estimates the function ui(ai, π−i) for the current value of π−i, while also maintaining
a separate mixed strategy πi ∈ P(Ai,Bi). The critic, Qi, informs the update of the actor, πi. In turn the observed
utilities received by the actor, πi, inform the update of the critic Qi.
In the continuous action space setting of this paper, we implement the actor-critic algorithm as the following iterative
process (for a pseudo-code implementation, see Algorithm 1):
1) At the n-th stage of the process, each player i = 1, . . . , N selects an action ain by sampling from the distribution
πin and uses ain to play the game.
2) Players update their critics using the update equation
Qin+1 = Q
i
n + γn ·
(
ui(·, a−in )−Q
i
n
) (3a)
3) Each player samples bin ∼ Liη(Qin) and updates their actor using the update equation
πin+1 = π
i
n + αn ·
(
δbin − π
i
n
)
. (3b)
The algorithm above is the main focus of our paper, so some remarks are in order:
Remark 1. In (3a), it is assumed that a player can access ui(·, a−in ), so they can calculate how much they would
have received for each of their actions in response to the joint action that was selected by the other players. Even
though this assumption restricts the applicability of our method somewhat, it is relatively harmless in many settings
6— for instance, in congestion games such estimates can be calculated simply by observing the utilization level of the
system’s facilities. Note further that to implement this algorithm an individual need not actually observe the action
profile a−in , needing only the utility ui(·, a−in ). This means that a player need know nothing at all about the players
who don’t directly affect her utility function, which allows a degree of separation and modularisation in large systems,
as demonstrated in [38].
Remark 2. The logit response Liη used to sample the bin used in (3b) is now parameterised by Qin instead of π−i. This
is a trivial change in which we use Qi(·) in place of ui(·, π−i) in (1), which represents the fact that now players select
smooth best responses to their critic Qi instead of directly to the estimated mixed strategy of the other players.
Remark 3. Also in (3b), the players update towards a sampled bin instead of toward the full function Liη(Qin). This is
so that the critic πin can be represented as a collection of weighted atoms, instead of as a complicated and continuous
probability measure. Representing πin as a collection of atoms means that sampling ain ∼ πin is particularly easy.
On the other hand, sampling bin ∼ Liη(Qin) could be extremely difficult for general Qin. The gradual evolution of
the Qin however implies that a sequential Monte Carlo sampler [39] could be used to produce samples according to
Liη(Q
i
n). The representation of Qin is also potentially troublesome and we do not address it fully here. However one
could assume that each ui(ain) can be represented as a finite linear combination of basis functions such as a spline,
Fourier or wavelet basis. Another option would be to slowly increase the size of a Fourier or wavelet basis as n gets
large, resulting in vanishing bias terms which can be easily incorporated in the stochastic approximation framework.
Remark 4. Finally, we note that the updates (3a) and (3b) use different step size parametersαn and γn. This separation
is what allows the algorithm to be a two-timescales procedure, and is discussed at the start of Section III.
The remainder of this article works to prove the following theorem, while also providing several auxiliary results of
independent interest along the way:
Theorem 1. In a continuous-action-set potential game with bounded Lipschitz rewards and isolated equilibrium
components, the actor–critic algorithm (3) converges strongly to a component of the equilibrium set LEη (a.s.).
Remark. We recall here that the notion of strong convergence of probability measures πn → π∗ is defined by asking
that πn(A) → π∗(A) for every measurable A. As such, this notion of convergence is even stronger than the notion
of “convergence in probability” (vague convergence) used in the central limit theorem and other weak-convergence
results.
III. TWO-TIMESCALES STOCHASTIC APPROXIMATION IN BANACH SPACES
The analysis of systems such as Algorithm 1 is enabled by the use of two-timescales stochastic approximation
techniques [25]. By allowing αn/γn → 0 as n → ∞, the system can be analysed as if the ‘fast’ update (3a), with
higher learning parameter γn, has fully converged to the current value of the ‘slow’ system (3b), with lower learning
parameter αn. Note that it is not the case that we have an outer and inner loop, in which (3a) is run to convergence
7for every update of (3b): both the actor Qn and the critic πn are updated on every iteration. It is simply that the
two-timescales technique allows us to analyse the system as if there were an inner loop.
That being said, the results of [25] are only cast in the framework of finite-dimensional spaces. We have already ob-
served that with continuous action spaces Ai, the mixed strategies πi are probability measures in the space P(Ai,Bi),
and the critics Qi are L2 functions. Placing appropriate norms on these spaces results in Banach spaces, and in this
section we combine the two-timescales results of [25] with the Banach space stochastic approximation framework of
[16] to develop the tool necessary to analyse the recursion (3).
To that end, consider the general two-timescales stochastic approximation system
xn+1 = xn + αn+1 [F (xn, yn) + Un+1 + cn+1] , (4a)
yn+1 = yn + γn+1 [G(xn, yn) + Vn+1 + dn+1] , (4b)
where
• xn and yn are sequences in the Banach spaces (X, ‖ · ‖X) and (Y, ‖ · ‖Y ) respectively.
• {αn} and {γn} are the learning rate sequences of the process.
• F : X × Y → X and G : X × Y → Y comprise the mean field of the process.
• {Un} and {Vn} are stochastic processes in X and Y respectively. (For a detailed exposition of Banach-valued
random variables, see [40].)
• cn ∈ X and dn ∈ Y are bias terms that converge almost surely to 0.
We will study this system using the asymptotic pseudotrajectory approach of [41], which is already cast in the language
of metric spaces; since Banach spaces are metric, the framework of [41] still applies to our scenario. This modernises
the approach of [22] while also introducing the two-timescales technique to ‘abstract stochastic approximation’.
To proceed, recall that a semiflow Φ on a metric space, M , is a continuous map Φ : R+ ×M → M , (t, x) 7→
Φt(x), such that, Φ0(x) = x and Φt+s(x) = Φt
(
Φs(x)
)
for all t, s ≥ 0. As in simple Euclidean spaces, well-posed
differential equations on Banach spaces induce a semiflow [42]. A continuous function z : R+ →M is an asymptotic
pseudo-trajectory for Φ if for any T > 0,
lim
t→∞
sup
0≤s≤T
d
(
z(t+ s),Φs
(
x(t)
))
= 0.
Properties of asymptotic pseudo-trajectories are discussed in detail in [41].
We will prove that interpolations of the stochastic approximation process (4) result in asymptotic pseudotrajectories
to flows induced by dynamical systems on X and Y governed by F and G respectively. To do so, and to allow us
to state necessary assumptions on the processes, we define timescales on which we will interpolate the stochastic
approximation process. In particular, let ταn =
∑n
j=1 αj (with τα0 = 0), and for t ∈ R+ let mα(t) = sup{k ≥ 0; ταk ≤
t}. Similarly let τγn =
∑n
j=1 γj (with τγ0 = 0), and for t ∈ R+ let mγ(t) = sup{k ≥ 0; τγk ≤ t}.
With these timescales we define interpolations of the stochastic approximation processes (4). On the slow (α)
timescale we define a continuous-time interpolation x¯α : R+ → X of {xn}n∈N by letting
x¯α(ταn + s) = xn + s
xn+1 − xn
αn+1
(5)
8for s ∈ [0, αn+1). On the fast (γ) timescale we consider zn = (xn, yn) ∈ X × Y , and define the continuous time
interpolation z¯γ : R+ → X × Y of {zn}n∈N by letting
z¯γ(τγn + s) = zn + s
zn+1 − zn
γn+1
(6)
for s ∈ [0, γn+1).
Our assumptions, which are simple extensions to those of [25] and [41], can now be stated as follows:
A1) Noise control.
a) For all T > 0,
lim
n→∞
sup
k∈{n+1,...,mα(ταn+T )}


∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
X

 = 0,
lim
n→∞
sup
k∈{n+1,...,mγ(τγn+T )}


∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1Vj+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Y

 = 0.
b) {cn}n∈N and {dn}n∈N are bounded sequences such that ‖cn‖X → 0 and ‖dn‖Y → 0 as n→∞.
A2) Boundedness and continuity.
a) There exist compact sets C ⊂ X and D ⊂ Y such that xn ∈ C and yn ∈ D for all n ∈ N.
b) F and G are bounded and uniformly continuous on C ×D.
A3) Learning rates.
a) ∑∞n=1 αn =∞ and ∑∞n=1 γn =∞ with αn → 0 and γn → 0 as n→∞.
b) αn/γn → 0 as n→∞.
A4) Mean field behaviour.
a) For any fixed x˜ ∈ C the differential equation
dy
dt
= G(x˜, y) (7)
has unique solution trajectories that remain in D for any initial value y0 ∈ D. Furthermore the differential
equation (7) has a unique globally attracting fixed point y∗(x˜), and the function y∗ : C → D is Lipschitz
continuous.
b) The differential equation
dx
dt
= F (x, y∗(x)) (8)
has unique solution trajectories that remain in C for any initial value x0 ∈ C.
Assumption A1 is the standard assumption for noise control in stochastic approximation. It has traditionally caused
difficulty in abstract stochastic approximation, but recent solutions are discussed in the following paragraph. Assump-
tion A2 is simply a boundedness and continuity assumption, but can cause difficulty with some norms in function
spaces. Assumption A3 provides the two-timescales nature of the scheme, with both learning rate sequences con-
verging to 0, but αn becoming much smaller than γn. Finally Assumption A4 provides both the existence of unique
9solutions of the relevant mean field differential equations, and the useful separation of timescales in continuous time
which is directly analogous to Assumption (A1) of [25]. Note that we do not make the stronger assumption that there
exists a unique globally asymptotically stable fixed point in the slow timescale dynamics (8) [25, Assumption A2];
this assumption is not necessary for the theory presented here, and would unnecessarily restrict the applicability of the
results.
Note that the noise assumption A1(a) has traditionally caused difficulty for stochastic approximation on Banach
spaces: [23] considers the simple case where the stochastic terms are independent and identically distributed, whilst
[22] prove a very weak convergence result for a particular process which again uses independent noise. However [16]
provide criteria analogous to the martingale noise assumptions in RK which guarantee that the noise condition 1(a)
holds in useful Banach spaces. In particular, if {Un} is a sequence of martingale differences in Banach space X , then
lim
n→∞
sup
k∈{n+1,...,mα(ταn+T )}


∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1Uj+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
X

 = 0
with probability 1 if X is:
• the space of Lp functions for p ≥ 2, {αn}n∈N is deterministic with
∑
n∈N α
1+q/2
n <∞, {Un}n∈N is a martingale
difference sequence with respect to some filtration {Fn}n∈N, and supn∈N E [‖Un‖
q
Lp ] < ∞ (cf. the remark
following Proposition A.1 of [16]);
• the space of L1 functions on bounded spaces (see [43]); or
• the space of finite signed measures on a compact interval of R with the bounded Lipschitz norm (see [16, 26, 27]
or Section IV below) {αn}n∈N is deterministic with
∑
n∈N α
2
n < ∞, Un = δxn+1 − Pn where there exists
a filtration {Fn}n∈N such that Un is measurable with respect to Fn, Pn is a bounded absolutely continuous
probability measure which is measurable with respect to Fn and has density pn, and xn+1 is sampled from the
probability distribution Pn (Proposition 3.6 of [16]);
Clearly, if similar conditions also hold for Y then Assumption A1(a) holds.
Our first lemma demonstrates that we can analyse the system as if the fast system {yn} is fully calibrated to the
slow system {xn}. By this we mean that, for sufficiently large n, yn is close to the value it would converge to if xn
were fixed and yn allowed to fully converge.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions A1–A4,
‖yn − y
∗(xn)‖Y → 0 as n→∞.
Proof: Let Z = X × Y , with ‖ · ‖Z the induced product norm from the topologies of X and Y . Under this
topology, Z is a Banach space, and C ×D is compact. The updates (4) can be expressed as
zn+1 = zn + γn+1
[
H(zn) +Wn+1 + κn+1
]
, (9)
10
where H : Z → Z is such that H(zn) = (0, G(zn)), for 0 ∈ X , and
Wn =
(
αn
γn
Un, Vn
)
,
κn+1 =
(
αn+1
γn+1
[
F (zn) + dn+1
]
, en+1
)
.
Assumptions A1–A4 imply the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 of [16]. Most are direct translations, but the noise must
be carefully considered. For any n ∈ N, any T > 0, and any k ∈ {n+ 1, . . . ,mγ(τγn + T )},∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1(Wn+1 + κn+1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1Wn+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1κn+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1Wn+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
+
(
sup
k′∈{n+1,...,k}
‖κk′‖Z
)
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1Wn+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
+
(
sup
k′∈{n+1,...,mγ(τγn+T )}
‖κk′‖Z
)mγ(τγn+T )−1∑
j=n
γj+1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1Wn+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
+
(
sup
k′≥n+1
‖κk′‖Z
)
T
Since κn → 0, the second term converges to 0 as n→∞. Hence, using assumption A1 to control the first term,
lim
n→∞
sup
k∈{n+1,...,mγ(τγn+T )}
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
γj+1(Wn+1 + κn+1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
Z
= 0.
Therefore z¯γ(·) : R+ → X × Y , defined in (6), is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow defined by
dz
dt
= H
(
z(t)
)
. (10)
Assumption A4(a) implies that {(x, y∗(x)) : x ∈ C} is globally attracting for (10). Hence Theorem 6.10 of [41]
gives that zn → {(x, y∗(x)) : x ∈ C}. The result follows by the continuity of y∗ assumed in A4(a).
We use this fact to consider the evolution of xn on the slow timescale.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions A1–A4, the interpolation x¯α(·) : R+ → X , defined in (5), is an asymptotic pseudo-
trajectory to the flow induced by the differential equation (8).
Proof: Rewrite (4a) as
xn+1 = xn + αn+1
[
F
(
xn, y
∗(xn)
)
+ Un+1 + c˜n+1
]
, (11)
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where c˜n+1 = F (xn, yn)−F (xn, y∗(xn))+ cn+1. We will show that this is a well-behaved stochastic approximation
process. In particular, we need to show that c˜n can be absorbed into Un in such a way that the equivalent Assumption
A1 of [16] can be applied to Un + c˜n.
By Lemma 2 we have that ‖yn − y∗(xn)‖Y → 0. Hence we can define
δn = inf{δ > 0 : ∀m ≥ n, ‖ym − y
∗(xm)‖Y < δ}
with δn → 0 as n → ∞. By the uniform continuity of F , it follows that we can define a sequence εn → 0 such that
for all m ≥ n, ‖F (xm, ym)− F (xm, y∗(xm))‖X < εn.
From this construction, for any n ≥ 0 and for any k ∈ {n+ 1, . . . ,mα(ταn + T )},∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1
[
F
(
xn, yn
)
− F
(
xn, y
∗(xn)
)]∥∥∥∥∥∥
X
≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1εn
∥∥∥∥∥∥
X
≤ Tεn.
As in the proof of Lemma 2, similar arguments can be used for {cn}n∈N under assumption (A1)(b). Hence for all
T > 0,
lim
n→∞
sup
k∈{n+1,...,mα(ταn+T )}


∥∥∥∥∥∥
k−1∑
j=n
αj+1 c˜j+1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
X

 = 0.
Once again it is straightforward to show that, under (A1)-(A4), the slow timescale stochastic approximation (11)
satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 of [16], and therefore x¯(·) : R+ → X is an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory to
the flow induced by the differential equation (8).
While [41] provides several results that can be combined with Theorem 3, we summarise the result used in this
paper with the following corollary:
Corollary 4. Suppose that Assumptions A1–A4 hold. Then xn converges to an internally chain transitive set of the
flow induced by the mean field differential equation (8).
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5 above and Theorem 5.7 of [41], where the definition of
internally chain transitive sets can be found.
IV. STOCHASTIC APPROXIMATION OF THE ACTOR–CRITIC ALGORITHM
In this section we demonstrate that the actor–critic algorithm (3) can be analysed using the two-timescales stochastic
approximation framework of Section III. Our first task is to define the Banach spaces in which the algorithm evolves.
Note that the set P(Ai,Bi) of probability distributions on Ai is a subset of the space M(Ai,Bi) of finite signed
measures on (Ai,Bi). To turn this space into a Banach space, the most convenient norm for our purposes is the
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bounded Lipschitz (BL) norm.3 To define the BL norm, let
Gi = {g : Ai → R : sup
a∈Ai
|g(a)|+ sup
a,b∈Ai,a 6=b
|g(a)− g(b)|
|a− b|
≤ 1}.
Then, for µ ∈M(Ai,Bi) we define
‖µ‖BLi = sup
g∈Gi
∣∣∣∣
∫
Ai
g(dµ)
∣∣∣∣ .
M(Ai,Bi) with norm ‖ · ‖BLi is a Banach space [27], and convergence of a sequence of probability measures under
‖ · ‖BLi corresponds to weak convergence of the measures [26]. Under the BL norm, P(Ai,Bi) is a compact subset
of M(Ai,Bi) (see Proposition 4.6 of [16]), allowing Assumption A2 to be easily verified.
We consider mixed strategy profiles as existing in the subset ∆ of the product space Σ = M(A1,B1) × · · · ×
M(AN ,BN). We use the max norm to induce the product topology, so that if µ = (µ1, . . . , µN) ∈ Σ we define
‖µ‖BL = max
i=1,...,N
‖µi‖BLi . (12)
Suppose also that utility functions ui are bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Since their domain is a bounded
interval of R we can assume that the estimates Qin are in the Banach space L2(Ai) of functions Ai → R with a finite
L2 norm, under the L2 norm. Hence we consider the vectors Q
n
= (Q1n, . . . , Q
N
n ) as elements of the Banach space
Y = ×Ni=1L
2(Ai) with ‖Q‖Y = maxi=1,...,N ‖Qi‖L2 .
Theorem 5. Consider the actor–critic algorithm (3). Suppose that for each i the action spaceAi is a compact interval
of R, and the utility function ui is bounded and uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Suppose also that {αn}n∈N and
{γn}n∈N are chosen to satisfy Assumption A3 as well as
∑
n∈N α
2
n < ∞ and
∑
n∈N γ
2
n < ∞. Then, under the
bounded Lipschitz norm, {πn}n∈N converges with probability 1 to an internally chain transitive set of the flow defined
by the N -player logit best response dynamics
dπ
dt
= Lη(π)− π. (13)
Proof: We take (X, ‖·‖X) = (Σ, ‖·‖BL), and (Y, ‖·‖Y ) as above. This allows a direct mapping of the actor–critic
algorithm (3) to the stochastic approximation framework (4) by taking
xn = πn,
F (π,Q) = Lη(Q)− π,
Un+1 = (δb1n , . . . , δbNn )− Lη(Q),
cn = 0
3For a discussion regarding the appropriateness of this norm for game-theoretical considerations, see [18, 26, 27], and, for stochastic
approximation, especially [16].
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and
yn = Qn,
G(π,Q) = (G1(π,Q), . . . , GN (π,Q)),
Gi(π,Q) = ui(·, π−i)−Qi,
Vn+1 = (V
1
n+1, . . . , V
N
n+1),
V in+1 = u
i(·, a−in )− u
i(·, π−in ),
dn = 0.
By Corollary 4 we therefore only need to verify Assumptions A1–A4.
A1: Un is of exactly the form studied by [16] and therefore Proposition 3.6 of that paper suffices to prove the
condition on the tail behaviour of
∑
j αj+1Uj+1 holds with probability 1. The Vn+1 are martingale difference
sequences, since E(ui(·, a−in ) | Fn) = ui(·, π−in ), and the Qn+1 are L2 functions. Hence Proposition A.1 of
[16] suffices to prove the condition on the tail behaviour of ∑j γj+1Vj+1 holds with probability 1 under the
L2 norm. Since cn and dn are identically zero, we have shown that A1 holds.
A2: ∆ is a compact subset of Σ under the bounded Lipschitz norm, so taking C = ∆ suffices. Furthermore, with
bounded continuous reward functions ui it follows that the Qin are uniformly bounded and equicontinuous
and therefore remain in a compact set D. G is clearly uniformly continuous on the compact set C ×D. The
continuity of Lη, and therefore F , is shown in Lemma C.2 of [16].
A3: The learning rates are chosen to satisfy this assumption.
A4: For fixed π˜, the differential equations
Q˙i = ui(·, π˜−i)−Qi
converge exponentially quickly to Qi = ui(·, π˜−i). Furthermore ui(·, π−i) is Lipschitz continuous in π−i,
so part (a) is satisfied. Equation (8) then becomes
π˙i = Liη(u
i(·, π−i))− πi, for i = 1, . . . , N .
Since we re-wrote Liη to depend on the utility functions instead of directly on π−i, we find that we have
recovered the logit best response dynamics of [18] and [16], which those authors show to have unique
solution trajectories.
V. CONVERGENCE OF THE LOGIT BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
We have shown in Theorem 5 that the actor–critic algorithm (3) results in joint strategies {πn}n∈N that converge
to an internally chain transitive set of the flow defined by the logit best response dynamics (13) under the bounded
Lipschitz norm. It is demonstrated in [16] that in two-player zero-sum continuous action games the set LEη of logit
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equilibria (the fixed points of the logit best response Lη) is a global attractor of the flow. Hence, by Corollary 5.4 of
[41] we instantly obtain the result that any internally chain transitive set is contained in LEη .
However two-player zero-sum games are not particularly relevant for control systems: multiplayer potential games
are much more important. The logit best responses in a potential game are identical to the logit best responses in
the identical interest game in which the potential function is the global utility function. Hence evolution of strategies
under the logit best response dynamics in a potential game is identical to that in the identical interest game in which
the potential acts as the global utility. We therefore carry out our convergence analysis for the logit best response
dynamics (13) in N -player identical interest games with continuous action spaces. See [44] for related issues.
For the remainder of this section we work to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6. In a potential game with continuous bounded rewards, in which the connected components of the set LEη
of logit equilibria of the game are isolated, any internally chain transitive set of the flow induced by the smooth best
response dynamics (13) is contained in a connected component of LEη .
Define
∆D =


π ∈ ∆ :
∀i = 1, . . . , N , πi is absolutely continuous
with density pi such that D−1 ≤ pi(xi) ≤
D for all xi ∈ Ai and pi is Lipschitz
continuous with constant D


.
Appendix C of [16] shows that if the utility functions ui are bounded and Lipschitz continuous then, for any η > 0,
there exists a D such that Lη(π) ∈ ∆D for all π ∈ ∆, and that ∆D is forward invariant under the logit best response
dynamics. For the remainder of this article, D is taken to be sufficiently large for this to be the case.
Our method first demonstrates that the set ∆D is globally attracting for the flow, so any internally chain transitive
set of the flow is contained in ∆D. The nice properties of ∆D then allow the use of a Lyapunov function argument to
show that any internally chain transitive set in ∆D is a connected set of logit equilibria.
Lemma 7. Let Λ ⊂ ∆ be an internally chain-transitive set. Then Λ ⊂ ∆D .
Proof: Consider the trajectory of (13) starting at an arbitrary π(0) ∈ ∆. We can write π(t) as
π(t) = e−tπ(0) +
∫ t
0
es−tLη(π(s)) ds.
Defining
σ(t) =
∫ t
0 e
s−tLη(π(s)) ds
1− e−t
it is immediate both that σ(t) ∈ ∆D and
‖π(t)− σ(t)‖BL < 2e
−t. (14)
Thus π(t) approaches ∆D at an exponential rate, uniformly in π(0). Hence ∆D is uniformly globally attracting.
We would like to invoke Corollary 5.4 of [41], but since ∆D may not be invariant it is not an attractor in the
terminology of [41] either. We therefore prove directly that Λ ⊂ ∆D . Suppose not, so there exists a point p ∈ Λ \∆D
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and by the compactness of internally chain transitive sets there exists a δ > 0 such that infπ∈∆D ‖p− π‖ = 2δ. There
exists a T > 0 such that for the trajectory p(t) with p(0) = p, infπ∈∆D ‖p(T ) − π‖ < δ, and so ‖p(T ) − p‖ > δ.
Hence, as in the proof of Proposition 5.3 of [41], p cannot be part of an internally chain recurrent set (see [41]). Since
internally chain transitive sets are internally chain recurrent sets [41, Proposition 5.3] we have a contradiction. Hence
Λ ⊂ ∆D .
We are now left to find the internally chain transitive sets of the flow restricted to ∆D . Since all elements of ∆D
admit densities, we can define a Lyapunov function based on the densities of the mixed strategies. For an absolutely
continuous mixed strategy πi with density function pi, we define the entropy
νi(πi) = −
∫
Ai
p(xi) log p(xi) dxi.
The Lyapunov function to be considered is
Vη(π) = −
[
u(π) + η
N∑
i=1
νi(πi)
]
(15)
where ui(π) = u(π) for all i. For Vη to be a useful Lyapunov function, it must be continuous with respect to the
bounded Lipschitz norm that we use on strategy space.
Lemma 8. Vη : ∆D → R is continuous with respect to the bounded Lipschitz norm.
Proof: Note that u is multilinear and therefore continuous. Therefore it suffices to show that the entropy ν(πi) is
continuous in πi.
Consider two densities p and q corresponding to distributions P and Q on a finite interval A ⊂ R, and assume that
p(x), q(x) ∈ [D−1, D] for all x ∈ A, and both p and q are Lipschitz continuous with constant D. We calculate that
|ν(P )− ν(Q)| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
p(x) log(p(x)) − q(x) log(q(x)) dx
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
A
|p(x)− q(x)|| log(p(x))| dx
+
∫
A
q(x)| log(p(x))− log(q(x))| dx
≤ log(D)
∫
A
|p(x) − q(x)| dx
+D
∫
A
| log(p(x)) − log(q(x))| dx,
since both p(x) and q(x) are uniformly bounded above by D. Furthermore, since log is Lipschitz on [D−1, D] with
constant D, | log(p(x)) − log(q(x))| ≤ D|p(x)− q(x)|. We therefore see that
|ν(P )− ν(Q)| ≤ (logD +D2)
∫
A
|p(x) − q(x)| dx.
It remains to show that this integral is arbitrarily small for sufficiently close P and Q under the bounded Lipschitz
norm. Note that this is not the case for arbitrary P and Q, but the Lipschitz continuity of p and q ensure that we
can complete the result. In particular, suppose that there exists an x∗ such that p(x∗) − q(x∗) > ǫ. To reduce the
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notational effort assume that x∗ ± ǫ/(4D) ∈ A to avoid boundary effects (which can be accommodated simply but
with more notation). For x ∈ [x∗ − ǫ/(4D), x∗ + ǫ/(4D)] we have that p(x) > q(x) + ǫ/2. Define a test function
g(x) = max(0, ǫ/(8D)− |x− x∗|/2). We have that
‖P −Q‖BL ≥
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
(p(x) − q(x))g(x) dx
∣∣∣∣
=
∫ x∗+ǫ/(4D)
x∗−ǫ/(4D)
(p(x)− q(x))g(x) dx
≥
∫ x∗+ǫ/(4D)
x∗−ǫ/(4D)
ǫ
2
g(x) dx
=
ǫ3
64D
.
So by taking ‖P −Q‖BL small, we can force p(x)− q(x) to be uniformly small, and hence
∫
A |p(x)− q(x)| dx to be
small, giving the result.
Lemma 9. The function Vη is strictly decreasing for any trajectory in ∆D whenever π /∈ LEη.
Proof: Using the Gateaux derivative,
V˙η(π) = dVη(π, π˙)
= −
[
du(π, π˙) + η
N∑
i=1
dνi(πi, π˙i)
]
= −
N∑
i=1
[
du((πi, π−i), π˙i) + ηdνi(πi, π˙i))
]
.
It follows directly from the definition of the derivatives that du((πi, π−i), π˙i) =
∫
Ai u(a
i, π−i))π˙i(dai). Re-arranging
the definition of liη(π−i) from (2) gives
u(ai, π−i) = η log(liη(π
−i)(ai))
+ η log
[∫
Ai
exp{η−1u(a˜i, π−i)} da˜i
]
.
So, noting that
∫
Ai
π˙i(dai) = 0,∫
Ai
u(ai, π−i)π˙i(dai) = η
∫
Ai
log(liη(π
−i)(ai))π˙i(dai).
It is shown in [16, equation (D.3)] that dνi(πi, π˙i) = − ∫Ai log(pi(ai))π˙i(dai). Hence
V˙η(π) = −η
N∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log(liη(π
−i)(ai))− log(pi(ai))
]
π˙i(dai)
= −η
N∑
i=1
∫
Ai
[
log(liη(π
−i)(ai))− log(pi(ai))
]
×
[
liη(π
−i)(ai)− pi(ai)
]
dai
= −η
N∑
i=1
{
KL(liη(π
−i) ‖ pi) +KL(pi ‖ liη(π
−i))
}
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where KL(· ‖ ·) is the Kullback–Leibler divergence, which is non-negative and zero only when the two arguments are
equal. Therefore Vη is strictly decreasing unless pi = liη(π−i) for all i, which is exactly the condition that π ∈ LEη.
We thus have a continuous function which is decreasing whenever π /∈ LEη. However, as demonstrated by [41], this
is insufficient to prove that all internally chain transitive sets are contained in LEη. We could use a further result, that
the set of values Vη takes at points π ∈ LEη is a measure zero set. This is usually achieved by using Sard’s theorem
(see [44] for example), but Smale’s generalisation of Sard’s theorem to Banach spaces does not apply in our case. We
therefore prove a new result directly, using the provided condition that the connected components of the set of logit
equilibria LEη are isolated.
Lemma 10. Let V : M → R be a strict Lyapunov function for some flow Φ on a metric space M . If the connected
equilibrium components of Φ are isolated, and V is constant on each component, every internally chain transitive set
of Φ is contained in such a component.
Proof: Recall first that an internally chain transitive set Λ is a compact, connected, invariant and attractor-free set.
Let Λ0 = argmin{V (x) : x ∈ Λ}, and V0 = min{V (x) : x ∈ Λ}. It then follows that Λ0 only consists of equilibria
of V : otherwise, if x ∈ Λ0 is not an equilibrium, we would have V (Φ(x, t)) < V (x) for all t > 0, contradicting the
fact that Λ is forward invariant and V (x) ≥ V0 for all x ∈ Λ.
Now, assume there exists some x ∈ Λ with V (x) > V0. Then, take ǫ > 0 small enough so that the closed set
Λǫ = {x ∈ Λ : V (x) ≤ V0 + ǫ} contains no other equilibria of Φ except those in Λ0 (that this is possible follows
from the fact that V is constant on equilibrium components and that these components are isolated). Since V is a strict
Lyapunov function for Φ we will also have Φ(Λǫ, t) ⊆ int(Λǫ) for all t > 0 (recall that Λ0 is contained in the interior
of Λǫ and Λǫ has no other equilibria), so Λǫ contains an attractor of Φ for all ǫ > 0 [41, Lemma 5.2]. This contradicts
the fact that Λ is attractor-free, so we must have V (x) = V0 for all x ∈ Λ, i.e. Λ = Λ0.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6 and – finally – Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 6: Vη is necessarily constant on connected components of LEη, so the conditions of Lemma
10 are met. Therefore any internally chain transitive (under bounded Lipschitz norm) set of the flow defined by (13) is
contained in a connected component of the set LEη . This is precisely Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 1: Theorem 5 shows that {πn}n∈N converges under the bounded Lipschitz norm to an internally
chain transitive set of the flow defined by the logit best response dynamics. Theorem 6 shows that any internally chain
transitive set of these dynamics is contained in LEη . It thus follows that πn converges to LEη weakly.
To establish our strong convergence claim, recall first that every probability measure in LEη is nonatomic and
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on R. On the other hand, if π∗ is a (weak) limit point of πn,
we will have πn(A)→ π∗(A) for every continuity set A of π∗ (i.e. for every measurable set A such that π(∂A) = 0).
Since every weak limit point of πn is contained in LEη and Borel sets are also continuity sets for absolutely continuous
measures, our assertion follows.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced an actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithm for potential games with continuous
action sets. By utilizing two different timescales for the actor and critic updates (fast and slow respectively), we showed
that the algorithm converges strongly to the game’s set of logit equilibria with minimal information requirements – in
particular, players are not assumed to observe their opponents’ actions or to have full knowledge of their individual
payoff functions.
From a practical point of view, this provides an attractive algorithmic framework for distributed control and op-
timization in complex systems with sparse feedback – such as rate control and power allocation in large-scale,
decentralized wireless networks. In addition, from a theoretical point of view, our approach provided a nontrivial
extension of several finite-dimensional stochastic approximation techniques to infinite-dimensional Banach spaces.
In this way, the proposed framework can be applied and extended to different scenarios of high practical relevance
(especially in the context of wireless networks) such as the case of noisy/imperfect payoff observations, asynchronous
and/or delayed player updates, etc. These research directions lie beyond the scope of the current work, but we intend
to pursue them in a future paper.
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